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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
LELAND W. SIMPER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
HARRY THORSEN and MILDRED 
THORSEN, husband and wife, ~ 
Defendants and Appellants. ) 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
AND RESPONDENT 
Civil No. 
8305 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial 
District in and for the County of Sevier 
Honorable John L. Sevy, Jr., Judge 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Throughout this brief we will refer to the parties as 
they are designated in the lower court in the manner 
adopted by the Appellant. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
The statement of facts prepared by the Defendants is 
substantially accurate, but in order fully to apprise the 
Court of the Plaintiff's position we believe it to be neces-
sary to set out the following: 
The Plaintiff has owned and operated a ranch located 
in Gooseberry, Salina Canyon, Utah since the .1Oth day of 
February, 1930 (R. 28, 29). He received the title to the 
property by Warranty Deed from his father, Thomas W. 
Simper (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1). 
He grazed cattle on his property and also raised crops 
of grain, hay and occasionally raised potatoes (R. 29). The 
land, in order to produce crops, required irrigation and the 
Plaintiff obtained water from a right in Gooseberry Creek, 
which water is not involved in this action, and from a spring 
area known as Branch Springs "located in the lower end of 
Kelsy Bird's field", (R. 49, 64, and 65, Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 2) , land now owned by Ern ell Peterson ( R. 64, 115). 
Branch Spings is designated on Defendants' Exhibit "A" 
as Spring Area No. 1. Also, Plaintiff received water from 
Reservoir No. 2 located on property now owned by the De-
fendants designated on Defendants' Exhibit "A" as Spring 
Area No.2. 
The Plaintiff would take water from these spring areag 
through a well defined natural channel which runs in a 
northerly direction to his land (R. 46 & 116). The water, 
if unobstructed, would run from Branch Springs, or Spring 
Area No. 1, into a small pond known as Ernell Peterson's 
pilierel 
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3 
gathered water from Spring Area No. 2 on the way to 
Plaintiff's land (R. 45, 72 & 94). 
The Plaintiff derived his right and title involved in this 
action through an assignment from his father, Thomas W. 
Simper, by an instrument dated September 19th, 1932 (R. 
33, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2). His father in turn acquired 
the rights from one Charles A. Mott under a certain deed 
executed December 31st, 1888 and recorded January 11th, 
1889 in the records of Sevier County (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 3) . These instruments of conveyance are more fully 
discussed in Plaintiff's Argument herein. Plaintiff and 
Plaintiff's witnesses testified that he had use of the water 
from the described spring areas during the time he has 
owned his land at Gooseberry with the exception of some 
interruptions (R. 39, 83, 96, 105). Witnesses o(the Plain-
tiff also testified that water from the described spring areas 
was used on the land by the Plaintiff and his predecssors 
in title so long as they could recall and back to the year of 
1908 or 1910 (R. 100, 101, 102, & 112). During the course 
of the trial there is no testimony from either witnesses of 
the Plaintiff or the Defendants that all of the water from 
these sources was ever denied the Plaintiff. It was affir-
matively shown that the Plaintiff has had a continuous use 
of water from the spring areas and that the flow was never 
completely stopped (R. 81, 102, 110, 138). 
During the month of May, 1951, the Plaintiff had 
trouble with the Defendant, Harry Thorsen, regarding the 
water. The Plaintiff after that date dammed off ditches 
leading to Defendants' property on several occasions. There-
after on September 19th, 1951, the Plaintiff filed a com-
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4 
plaint and commenced this action against the Defendants 
seeking damages and a determination of his rights to the 
waters involved in this controversy. 
The Court after hearing the evidence and having 
viewed the spring areas, made a finding that the Branch 
Springs were one and the same springs as those designated 
by the Defendants' Exhibit "A" as Spring Area No. 1, and 
entered the Decree quieting Plaintiff's title to all waters 
arising therefrom (R. 15, 18). The Court reserved any 
finding or award on Spring Area No. 2 and stated that 
there was insufficient evidence to justify a finding of ap-
propriation and use of waters by either the Plaintiff or 
Defendants (R. 11). From this decision of the Court, the 
Defendant has appealed. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THAT THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FIND-
ING THAT BRANCH SPRING EMBRACES ALL 
OF SPRING AREA NO. 1 AND INCLUDES ALL 
THE WATER SOURCES THEREIN. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S 
FINDING THAT THOMAS W. SIMPER, PLAIN-
TIFF'S PREDECESSOR IN TITLE, ACQUIRED 
OWNERSHIP OF ALL WATERS FROM 
BRANCH SPRING WHICH INCLUDES THE 
WATERS OF SPRING AREA NO. 1, BY A 
DEED EXECUTED BY CHARLES A. MOTT. 
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POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S 
FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS EN-
TITLED TO THE USE OF ALL THE WATERS 
FROM BRANCH SPRING WHICH INCLUDES 
THE WATERS OF SPRING AREA NO. 1. 
POINT IV. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
ADMITTING PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS "1" 
THROUGH "4" AND PROPERLY DENIED 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR NONSUIT. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED 
DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM FOR A DE-
CREE QUIETING TITLE IN THEM TO 
BRANCH SPRING WHICH THE COURT PROP-
ERLY FOUND TO INCLUDE ALL THE WAT-
ERS OF SPRING AREA NO. 1. 
POINT VI. 
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN OVERRULING DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL IN THIS CAUSE. 
POINT VII. 
THAT THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN REFUSING TO FIND IN DEFENDANTS' 
FAVOR UPON THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANTS' 
DAMAGES. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FIND-
ING THAT BRANCH SPRING EMBRACES ALL 
OF SPRING AREA NO. 1 AND INCLUDES ALL 
THE WATER SOURCES THEREIN. 
The waters not involved in this controversy which 
should be distinguished are those from Gooseberry Creek. 
The other waters described in Defendants' brief as the 
spring located in the immediate northwest corner of Spring 
Area No. 1 which they have termed the pipe spring, is a 
part of Spring Area No. 1 or Branch Springs. The water 
described as Spring Area No. 2 includes what is described 
as Reservoir No.2 in Plaintiff's Exhibit 3. The Appellants' 
contend that the findings and decree of the lower court, as 
well as its decision and memorandum of August 1, 1953 (R. 
10 through 19), together with its order overruling motion 
for new trial (R. 21, 22) show that the court failed to make 
any distinction whatever in the identity of water rights 
involved. It is clearly apparent from the record that the 
court understood and identified the water involved in this 
action and that the record fully supports the decision of 
the court. 
The witness, George Simper, testified that this water 
was all of the water designated by Defendants in their 
exhibits and testimony as the Spring Area No. 1. 
R. p. 101: 
"Q. (Mr. Beal) And those waters, and all of 
them, derived in this area were used by your father, 
and with your assistance, on this farm? 
"A. Yes Sir. 
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"Q. Was your right ever interrupted or dis-
turbed? 
"A. No sir ; not in the early days ; there was 
nobody there to interrupt or take it. 
"Q. And this property here that is now claimed 
by Mr. Thorsen or the property that. was owned by 
Mr. Bird, was public domain at that time you were 
there, was it? 
"A. That's right." 
R. p. 100: 
"Q. But you were there when your father 
owned it? 
"A. Yes, a long time ago. 
"Q. Calling your attention to-What years 
would that have been, George? 
"A. Well, that would date back to probably 
about 1908 or 10, up until forty or forty five. 
"Q. And so during that period of time you 
have had rather intimate operations of this area, 
have you? 
"A. Yes Sir. 
"Q. Now, where is the source of water derived 
from that was used during those years for irrigation 
of this land that is now operated and owned by your 
brother? 
"A. Well, the deeded water came out of the 
creek, the Gooseberry Creek, and they had acqui-
sition to those springs you have been referring to." 
This testimony clearly shows the water covered by the deeds, 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 2 & 3, to have been all the waters of 
Branch Spring, and all the waters of Branch Spring to have 
been all that water arising in Spring Area No. 1 as desig-
nated by Defendants. The testimony of Leland Simper, 
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plaintiff in this action, also identifies Branch Springs and 
Spring Area No. 1 as one and the same water sources from 
which his water came (R. 81, 82). 
As we have argued in Point I hereinabove, while the 
trial court may have erroneously designated the Branch 
Spring to be synonymous with the Big Spring, nevertheless 
there is ample evidence to support the fact that the court 
was clear in its identification of the water sources, as shown 
by its Decision and Memorandum (R. 10, 13) and to sup-
port the court's finding that Branch Spring included all of 
the Spring A rea No. 1. 
The court viewed the premises and used the following 
language in its memorandum (R. 13) in identifying Branch 
Springs as one and the same as that spring area and the 
water sources designated as Spring Area No. 1: 
"* * * the physical evidence discloses that 
all of the several channels or branches of said spring, 
if unobstructed and uninterfered with, naturally 
flow to the area of what is described in Defendants' 
Exhibit A as the Ernel Peterson pond from whence 
they flow into the natural channel or "C" ditch, de-
scribed in the last-named exhibit, and thence to 
Plaintiff's lands, and Plaintiff's evidence shows that 
he and his predecessor father have always used 
beneficially all waters that came through said nat-
ural channel or "C" ditch to his farm, and this ap-
pears to be the only course these waters, if uninter-
fered with, could have taken since their deeding by 
Mott to Simper." 
The decision of the court and the position of the Plaintiff 
is further substantiated by the showing that the Defendants 
expressly admit that the Plaintiff is entitled to all those 
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waters flowing from the pipe spring which was one of the 
springs designated in Spring Area No. 1 or Branch Springs. 
It is shown by testimony that the spring flowed from a two 
inch pipe and that it flowed a very small stream (R. 184). 
This amount of water would not be sufficient to flow any 
distance, let alone the distance to the Plaintiff's land, and 
in a force sufficient to be used for irrigation purposes. It 
is clearly apparent that more water was available to Plain-
tiff and was used by the Plaintiff. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S 
FINDING THAT THOMAS W. SIMPER, PLAIN-
TIFF'S PREDECESSOR IN TITLE, ACQUIRED 
OWNERSHIP OF ALL WATERS FROM 
BRANCH SPRING WHICH INCLUDES THE 
WATERS OF SPRING AREA NO. 1, BY A 
DEED EXECUTED BY CHARLES A. MOTT. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S 
. 
FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS EN-
TITLED TO THE USE OF ALL THE WATERS 
FROM BRANCH SPRING vVHICH INCLUDES 
THE WATERS OF SPRING AREA NO. 1. 
POINT IV. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
ADMITTING PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS "1" 
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THROUGH "4" AND PROPERLY DENIED 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR NONSUIT. 
Since the Defendants and Appellants have consolidated 
their argument upon these points, and Plaintiff and Re-
spondent will respond similarly. 
We agree with Appellants that whoever first approp-
riated water by beneficial use prior to 1903 is the owner 
thereof and entitled to pass title thereto. We likewise agree 
that the law prior to 1903 required no certification or re-
cording of such rights; that title was and must continue 
to be based on proof of use. 
We cannot agree, however, that deeds and memoranda 
are incompetent and inadmissible as proof of ownership of 
water where title is in controversy. 
While we concede that ordinarily self-serving docu-
ments and memoranda, including deeds, are not competent 
evidence against third parties, we nevertheless contend that 
the Plaintiff's Exhibit "3" falls within a well defined ex-
ception to that rule, that of recitals in Ancient Deeds. It is 
well settled that recitals in ancient deeds are competent 
evidence of facts recited therein even as against strangers 
to the title, when accompanied by possession under the deed 
or other corroborating circumstances. 20 Am. Jur. 794, 
Evidence, Sec. 941. Exhibit "3" of Plaintiff is such a deed. 
Exhibit "3" is a deed executed December 31, 1888, re-
corded January 11, 1889, from Charles A. Mott to Thomas 
W. Simper, Plaintiff's grantor, in which it is recited that 
for the consideration of $200.00, [which the trial court 
found to be "substantial" (R. 10)] the grantor conveyed 
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"the Branch Spring of water, lying and being situate at 
the lower end of Kelsey Bird's field, Gooseberry Precinct, 
Sevier County, Utah; said spring located October 1884 and 
duly recorded to the party of the first part December 21, 
1888 in Book G-1, page 47, Sevier County Records." 
As has been argued in our Point No. I hereinabove, we 
contend that the court properly found, after hearing the 
evidence and viewing the physical properties involved, that 
the "Branch Spring" referred to in that deed embraces the 
entire water source within "Spring Area No. 1." 
If the Branch Spring includes all those waters, then 
the remaining question is whether or not there is sufficient 
evidence upon which to base the court's finding of a dili-
gence right, acquired by beneficial use prior to 1903, by 
Charles A. Matt. 
In the recent case of Edmunds v. Plianos, 74 S.D. 260. 
51 N. W. 2d 701, it was held that a recital in an ancient 
deed as to the existence of an alley at the rear of property 
conveyed is competent evidence of the fact of dedication of 
the alley. The dearth of satisfactory evidence there made 
it proper to admit the ancient deeds even as against stran-
gers to the title. 
In Fulkerson v. Holmes, 117 U. S. 389, 29 L. Ed. 915, 
6 S. Ct. 780, the United States Supreme Court has held that 
a deed more than 60 years old may be admitted in evidence 
against third parties to prove contained recitals even in 
the absence of proof of possession by the parties offering 
it. 
No case closer to the facts involved here could be found 
than the reported decision preceding the note in 6 A. L. R. 
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found at page 1433, Gabarino v. Noce, 183 P. 532, where it 
is said that: 
"Having been executed for more than 50 years 
before the present controversy arose [the deed] 
comes within the rules of evidence applicable to 
ancient deeds and hence the recitals therein relating 
to the property conveyed are competent evidence of 
the facts recited even against strangers to the deed 
* * * The recitals tend to show that the ditch 
was originally conducted by the owner of the lot for 
the purpose of conveying water from the creek to 
that lot. The fact that the title deeds of the Gar-
barino lot show this particular ditch as an appurten-
ance while the title deeds of the other lots make no 
mention thereof, is some evidence, at least, that the 
right thereto was not claimed by the owner of the 
other lots at the time of making the conveyances 
thereof." 
In Condit v. Galveston City Co., 186 S. W. 395, where 
title to shares of corporate stock were in controversy, a 
deed recited that the certificate in question was sold at 
public auction pursuant to an order of the probate court. 
The Plaintiffs contended that such evidence was inadmis-
sible, in the absence of any evidence showing that the trans-
feree or any person claiming under him had enjoyed pos-
session or shown acts of ownership. In that case, it was 
held that the ancient deed was properly admitted to prove 
the recitals. 
In the instant case, there is ample testimony of "cor-
roborating circumstances" as indicated in the note from 
American Jurisprudence, in the evidence of consistent use 
in the years 1908 or 10 to 1945 (R. 100-102). In the Texas 
case, even this requirement was not present. Certainly the 
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trial courts view of the premises established a consistent 
use (R. 13). 
Recitals in ancient instruments have been held admis 
sible to prove extent of title, source of title, and existence 
of other supporting instruments. Annotation, 6 A. L. R. 
1437. 
The reported case to that annotation holds that "it 
[the ancient deed] is also competent as a declaration of the 
grantor while in possession, as evidence that he then claimed 
full ownership of the ditch and water right." 
Ancient deeds are admitted as proof of their recitals 
as an exception to the hearsay rule upon the theory that 
time and possession have raised the presumption of their 
truth, which is admissible even as against strangers. 
The rule admitting ancient deeds to prove recitals 
therein contained pertaining to water rights appurtenant 
to the lands conveyed should reach great eminence in the 
state of Utah under its peculiar statutory and case law 
relating to diligence rights to the use of water. 
The time is rapidly approaching when direct testimony 
of use prior to 1903 will be absolutely unobtainable. Even 
today one, in order to have a recollection of occurrences 
antedating 1903, must be of an age in the early seventies. 
To adopt a rule urged by the Appellants that a prede-
cessor in title's use must be established and proved by 
direct testimony would be to establish a rule making multi-
tudes of anciently established water rights unaffirmablc 
by judicial proof. 
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In the trial court's memorandum (R. 12-14) it is clearly 
shown that the deeds were not given controlling weight, 
and possibly not even the weight to which, under the fore-
going decisions, they were entitled. The Court says: (R. 
11, last sentence, and 12) . 
"Charles A. Matt has assertedly located said 
spring in 1884 and recorded it in 1888, and while 
there is no competent evidence (a statement which 
apperently is refuted in the cited cases) in the 
record that Charles A. Mott ever himself put these 
waters to a beneficial use or that he owned land in 
that vicinity, the physical evidence [coming on 
through the court's view of the premises] (R. 10) 
discloses that all the several channels or branches of 
said spring, if unobstructed and uninterfered with, 
naturally flow to the area which is described in De-
fendants' Exhibit A as the Ernel Peterson pond 
from whence they flow into the natural channel or 
"C" ditch, described in the last named exhibit, and 
thence to Plaintiff's lands, and Plaintiff's evidence 
shows that he and his predecessor father have al-
ways used beneficially all waters that came through 
said natural channel or "C" ditch to his farm and 
this appears to be the only course these waters, if 
uninterfered with, could have taken since their deed 
by Mott to Simper. 
"The Defendant, as far as beneficial use prior 
to 1903 is concerned, which is the only basis on 
which he could rest his claim, is compelled to base 
his case solely upon the testimony of witnesses, 
* * * [who] were 3 and 5 years old when they 
settled with their parents 3,4 miles north of Branch 
Spring, and who were 8 and 10 years old in 1903, 
* * * more than 50 years after they left the 
scene of action. 
* * * * * 
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"However, taking the evidence as a whole, in-
cluding the physical conditions disclosed by a view 
of the premises, I am of the opinion that the evi-
dence of ownership of said waters, based on pur-
chase, appropriation and beneficial use prior to and 
including the year 1903, preponderates in favor of 
the Plaintiff." 
These are the findings which the Appellants must overcome 
by a showing that the trial court, having heard the wit-
nesses, and viewed the premises, has misapplied proven 
facts or found against the clear preponderance of the evi· · 
dence. (Cranford et al. v. Gibbs, ... Utah, 1st Series, ... , 
260 P. 2d 870. 
As to the evidence referenced in pages 21 to 25 of Ap-
pellants' brief, we agree with the trial court that this is no 
more than recurring interruptions by Defendants and their 
predecessors, and as to this we agree with Appellants when 
they sayp that they must do more than establish nonexis-
tence or inferiority of Plaintiff's title in order to prevail 
themselves. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED 
DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM FOR A DE-
CREE QUIETING TITLE IN THEM TO 
BRANCH SPRING WHICH THE COURT PROP-
ERLY FOUND TO INCLUDE ALL THE WAT-
ERS OF SPRING AREA NO. 1. 
In our Point No. V we shall address ourselves to the 
errors assigned by Defendants (here Appellants) in both 
their Points Numbered V and VI. 
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The trial court, close to the scene of events, hearing 
the witnesses, and v:iewing the premises, properly appraised 
the testimony of Casto (R. 156) and Nielsen (R. 204) in 
his memorandum decision (R. 13) where he says: 
"The Defendant, as far as beneficial use prior 
to 1903 is concerned, which is the only basis upon 
which he could rest his claim, is compelled to base his 
case solely upon the testimony of witnesses, a brother 
and a sister, children of Able N. Casto, one of De-
fendants' predecessors, which children were three 
and five years old, respectively, when they settled 
with their parents, not at, but some % of a mile 
north of Branch Spring, and who were eight and 
ten years old, respectively, in 1903, at and prior to 
which time the rights of the respective parties here-
in were fixed and which said brother and sister tes-
tified in the case, more than fifty years after they 
left the scene of action involved· in the case. 
"It is true, there is abundant evidence of almost 
constant interference with Plaintiff's use of said 
water, especially since John M. Bird's purchase in 
1933, from Able N. Casto, of the property now owned 
by the Defendant and also evidence in the wording 
of the deed from Able N. Casto to John M. Bird that 
Casto claimed ownership, in which might appear to 
be some of said waters. 
"[The court later amended the memorandum 
to show that Casto and Nielsen were there until 
1900, at which time they reached the ages of 16 
and 18 respectively, but did not consider this suffi-
cient to justify any change in his original decision 
(R. 21-22)] ." 
The specific reference of the court to this testimony dis-
counts the Defendants' contention that the court "ignored 
portions of the Plaintiff's case" (Br. App., p. 28). 
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We disagree with Defendants-Appellants in their itali-
cized statement on page 37 of their brief where they declare 
that "there is no evidence in the record to antedate the title 
of plaintiff's predecessors" which fact they attempted to 
prove by the testimony of Casto and Nielsen, who came to 
the area in 1887 (R. 156). We doubt seriously that those 
witnesses at the ages of 3 and 5 would have any recollection 
whatsoever as to evidence in 1887 but, on the contrary, 
urge that the deed admitted into evidence (entirely prop·-
erly, as argued in Points II, III, and IV herein) establishes 
a use of the Branch Springs-which the trial court found to 
include all the waters in Spring Area No. l-in October 
1884, the location of which date was recorded December 
21, 1888 in Book G-1, page 47 of the Sevier County records. 
Perhaps previous counsel for Plaintiff should have 
introduced a certified copy of the instrument referred to 
which has been since 1888 a matter of public record. How-
ever, the ancient document found at page 359 of the record 
proves the prior instrument. Fulkerson v. Holmes, supra. 
In any event, there are documents in existence and entered 
upon the public records since 1888 showing Plaintiff's ap-
propriation of Branch Spring which the trial court found 
to be the equivalent of Spring Area No. 1. 
With this factual premise we then agree entirely with 
Defendants that the controlling legal principle is that which 
they cite on page 36 of their brief, that "until 1903 when 
an exclusive method for appropriating water was prescribed 
by statute, water could be appropriated merely by diverting 
the water from its natural channel and putting it to a 
beneficial use." 
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Subsequent uses by Defendants' predecessors in inter-
est, and at a time when the witnesses Casto and Nielsen had 
attained an age of 14 or 16 years of age, the earliest possible 
age at which evidence as to their recollection could be at 
all creditable, could not initiate any right but were only 
interferences with an established right if such uses were 
in fact made. 
Certainly this was the rationale of the court's finding 
on page 13 of the record. 
POINT VI. 
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN OVERRULING DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL IN THIS CAUSE. 
The trial court at page 21 and 22 of the record con-
sidered the exceptions to the court's findings and rejected 
them. The attack was solely upon his findings of fact which 
we believe to be fully and adequately supported by the rec-
ord and which, in any event, as a matter of law cannot be 
upset except by a clear and convincing showing that the 
court has misapplied proven facts or made findings clearly 
against the weight of evidence. Cranford v. Gibbs, ... Utah 
... , 260 P. 2d 870. 
POINT VII. 
THAT THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN REFUSING TO FIND IN DEFENDANTS' 
FAVOR UPON THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANTS' 
DAMAGES. 
Upon the issue of damages, no case could have clearer 
application than Cranford v. Gibbs, supra. The testimony of 
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the defendants as to their own damages is based solely upon 
speculation and is not bottomed on logic or analogy. We 
first contend that the defendants were never entitled to any 
of the waters and therefore entitled to no damages for ex-
propriation by the Plaintiff. Assuming, arguendo only, 
this not to be the case, then we see no sufficient basis upon 
which the trial court could find other than he did that dam-
ages were based upon theories too speculative for an award. 
As to Defendants' claimed loss of alfalfa hay, this could 
be attributable to any number of causes: Poor husbandry, 
extreme drought, an unusually short growing season, or 
inclement weather. 
The same would apply to natural feed and other crops. 
The major portion of Defendants' claimed damages 
were in deficiencies in livestock production which the De-
fendants themselves tie directly to inferior and limited hay 
supplies. Besides being subject to the great margin fm· 
error in assuming that lack of water contributed to this 
condition, then speculation as to what their livestock would 
have produced becomes much more broadly speculative and 
even more remote and uncertain. 
It appears that nothing was done by the Defendants to 
mitigate this loss or to prevent this damage. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully contended that the trial court ha~ 
fairly and adequately determined all the facts before him 
in this trial. We believe that there is no manifest showing 
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of a misapplication of proven facts or a finding of fact 
clearly against the weight of evidence. 
We believe the trial court ought to be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
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